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ARTICLES
GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Michael P. Scharft
INTRODUCTION
In October 1993, the United States Government announced
a major policy reversal concerning the establishment of a per-
manent International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Previously, the
United States had sought to prolong without progressing the
debate on an ICC. Under the new policy, the United States
committed itself actively to work toward resolving the remain-
ing legal and practical issues attendant to establishing an ICC.
From August 1989 to July 1993, I served as the lawyer at
the U.S. Department of State with responsibility for drafting
the Government's testimony, speeches, and reports to Congress
and to the United Nations on the issue of an ICC. Although one
commentator has asserted that I was the architect of the Gov-
ernment's position,' my role was really more of wordsmith,
marshalling legal arguments to further policy directives from
higher level officials at the State Department and the Depart-
ment of Justice. Despite my personal support for the concept of
an ICC,2 these official statements expressed what Senator Spec-
t Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law; J.D., Duke Uni-
versity School of Law, 1988; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, 1989-1993.
1 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court:
Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 388
(1992).
2 See, Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for An Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 1991 Dui' J. Com]. & INTL L. 135 (1991); hereafter ("The
Jury is Still Outr) cited in Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
an International Criminal Court, S. Rep. No. 103-71, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1993); Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Feasibility of
and the Relationship to the Federal Judiciary of an International Criminal Court,
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ter has characterized as "cautious skepticism" about the feasi-
bility and desirability of establishing an ICC.3
The purpose of Part I of this article is to shed light (to the
extent possible without violating post-government employment
privileges) on the evolution of the U.S. Governments' position
from one of cautious skepticism to qualified support for the es-
tablishment of an ICC. Part II of the article analyzes and sug-
gests revisions to the proposed statute for an ICC recently
prepared by the UN International Law Commission ("ILC").
The text of the relevant provisions of the draft statute are ap-
pended at the end of the symposium section of this issue.
I. THE EVOLVING U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION: FROM
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM TO QUALIFIED SUPPORT
Until quite recently, the U.S. Executive Branch had stead-
fastly maintained the position that it would not support the es-
tablishment of an ICC unless or until all the difficult legal and
practical problems attendant to such an endeavor had been re-
solved to its complete satisfaction.4 While the U.S. Govern-
ment's statements and reports to Congress and to the United
October 28, 1991; American Bar Association Task Force on An International Crim-
inal Court (1992).
Prior to the publication of "The Jury is Still Out," the only commentary on the
issue were advocacy pieces, expressing uncritical support for the creation of such a
tribunal. See e.g., JuLIUs STONE & ROBERT K. WOETZEL, TowAnD A FEASIBLE INTER-
NATIONAL CnmqAL CouRT (1970); BENJAMwN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRim-
eAL CouRT: A STEP TowARD WoRLE PEACE (2 vols. 1980); M. CHERw BAssrouml, A
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIuINAL CODE AND DaAFr STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CmMINAL TRrBuNAL (1987); M. CherifBassiouni, The Time Has Come for an Inter-
national Criminal Court, 1 IND. INAL & Comp. L. REv. 1 (1991). As described be-
low, the position of the United States Government, on the other hand, bordered
somewhere between skepticism and opposition. "The Jury is Still Out" walked a
middle ground, attempting objectively and thoroughly to analyze both the benefits
and costs associated with establishing an international criminal court ("ICC"), and
thereby to sharpen the issues and progress the debate.
3 Supplemental Statement of Senator Arlen Specter for the Congressional
Record Regarding the Need for an International Criminal Court 5 (October 27,
1990), cited in Scharf, supra note 2 at 143.
4 See Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary of State for Legisla-
tive Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Dan Quayle, President of the Senate, and
Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct. 2, 1991); UNrrED
STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE EDWIN D.
WjILLIAMsON, UNITED STATES SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE UNIED NATIONS GENERAL
AsSEMBLY IN THE SITH CO~mrrrEE, USUN Press Release #113-(92) (1992) (hereaf-
ter STATEMENT BY EDwIN D. WILAMSON).
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Nations enumerated the many problems that required atten-
tion, they quite purposely were silent as to any possible solu-
tions. In this way, they furthered the goal of State and Justice
Department officials who desired to stall international progress
on the issue. Reading between the lines, the attitude of the U.S.
Government reflected residual mistrust of international tribu-
nals5 as well as a general concern that the establishment of an
ICC would undermine the Government's existing international
law enforcement efforts and authorities. 6
Notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Senators Specter
and Dodd (and especially Charles Bataglia and Matthew Hirsch
of their respective staffs), as well as Congressmen Leach and
Kastenmeier, the issue of an ICC never received serious consid-
eration by top officials in the Bush Administration. Nor has the
issue found its way on to Bill Clinton's list of priorities for the
United Nations.7 Consequently, despite supportive statements
about an ICC made during the confirmation hearings of the
newly appointed Secretary of State, Department of State Legal
Adviser, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Or-
ganizations Affairs in the Spring of 1993, the Government's po-
5 This mistrust stemmed in part from the adverse ruling in the Case Con-
cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392 (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility
of the Application). The Decision resulted in the United States' withdrawal from
the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. See Statement by the Legal Ad-
viser, Abraham D. Sofaer, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (December
4,1985), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PxUun R. TmMBL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1991 (In explaining the Government's decision to withdraw from the World Court'sjurisdiction, Sofaer stated: '[The ICJ] betrayed a predisposition to find that it had
jurisdiction and that Nicaragua's claims were justiciable, regardless of the over-
whelming legal case to the contrary.").
6 See e.g., the United States' controversial authority to apprehend interna-
tional criminals abroad without host country consent in United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (Holding that United States' courts could try per-
sons kidnapped by United States' agents from Mexico without Mexico's consent).
For differing views on Alvarez-Machain, see Malvina Halberstam, Agora: Interna-
tional Kidnapping, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 746 (1992) and Louis Henkin, Corre-
spondence, 87 AM. J. INTL L. 100 (1993).
7 The World Federalist Association sponsored a nation-wide letter writing
campaign urging President Clinton to endorse the establishment of an ICC during
his Sept. 27, 1993, address to the General Assembly. Notwithstanding this effort,
President Clinton did not mention the establishment of an ICC as one of the
United State's priorities for the United Nations. For a text of President Clinton's
remarks, see Clinton: UN Must Adapt to Different World, CmusTL SCIENCE MoN-
rrOR (September 29, 1993) at 19.
1994]
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sition did not dramatically change when the Clinton team came
on board.8
During the summer of 1993, however, the convergence of
various factors began to dislodge the United States Government
from its earlier position. Senators Specter and Dodd kept up
the pressure by holding hearings and introducing legislation
which would put the United States Congress on record in sup-
port of the concept of an ICC and call on the Administration to
support efforts of the United Nations to conclude an interna-
tional agreement for the establishment of an ICC.9 At the same
time, the attack on UN peacekeeping troops directed by Somali
warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid suggested an entirely new
need for an ICC. In response to the attack, the Security Council
passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General "to
arrest and detain for prosecution, trial and punishment" those
responsible for the attack.10 But the resolution was largely sym-
bolic since in the absence of an ICC there exists no UN forum in
which to bring such perpetrators to justice. Similarly, despite
two years of Security Council sanctions, the United States and
United Kingdom were no closer to convincing Libya to surren-
der the two Libyan officials allegedly behind the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103. Libya continued to insist on their trial only
before a neutral international tribunal. In the absence of an
ICC, the United States was unable to call Libya's bluff.
The most important factor of all was the establishment of
the international tribunal for Yugoslavia. Unable to act effec-
tively to halt Serbian aggression in Bosnia, and faced with
mounting political pressure to respond constructively to contin-
uing reports of widespread atrocities, the United States Govern-
ment decided to direct its energies to establishing an ad hoc
international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law committed in
8 See U.S. Department of State, "Comments of the United States on the Re-
port of the Working Group of the International Law Commission on the Question
of an International Criminal Jurisdiction," (May 1, 1993) (hereafter U.S. Depart-
ment of State).
9 See Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, supra at note 2.
10 S.C. Res. 837, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 at para. 5, (1993).
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the territory of the former Yugoslavia.11 To this end, in less
than four weeks time, the State Department's Office of Legal
Adviser, working with several other agencies, developed a pro-
posed statute for the Yugoslavia Tribunal which the United
States provided to the UN.12
Most of the United States' proposals found their way into
the Statute for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal that was
approved by the Security Council on May 25, 1993. Having suc-
cessfully, and quickly, tackled most of the same complex legal
and practical issues that it had identified as obstacles to a per-
manent ICC, the United States Government was left with little
basis to justify continued delay with regard to the ICC.
Meanwhile, due in no small part to the contributions of
Robert Rosenstock, 13 the ILC had made surprising progress in
formulating realistic and workable proposals for an ICC. At the
time my earlier article on this issue was published, the ILC was
considering whether an ICC should have exclusive (compulsory)
jurisdiction over a wide range of international crimes, many of
which the United States did not recognize (such as economic ag-
gression and colonial domination).14 The United States found
this approach anathema to its interests.
The 1992 Report of the ILC's International Criminal Court
Working Group greatly refined the ILC's earlier concept for an
ICC. is The Working Group recommended that an ICC be a
"flexible and supplementary facility" for State parties to its
statute and that the ICC not have exclusive jurisdiction. 16 As
11 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., at 2 (1993) (Deciding to estab-
lish Tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. Sf25626 (1993) (Approving Statute for the
Tribunal). For a detailed discussion, see James C. O'Brien, The International Ti-
bunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,
87 AM. J. IN'1L L. 639-59 (1993).
12 Later, the United States submitted a seventy-six page proposal for the Tri-
bunal's Rules of Evidence and Procedure, with commentary. See submission ac-
companying Letter from Michael Kiosson, Charge d'Affaires, United States
Embassy at the Hague to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali (November
18, 1993).
13 See generally the comments of Mr. Rosenstock on the creation of an ICC at
6 PACE INL L. REv.
14 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/45110 (1990).
15 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Fourth Session, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992).
16 Id. at 14-5.
1994]
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so envisioned, the purpose of the ICC would be to provide a
third alternative to States currently faced only with the choice
to prosecute or extradite international criminals found within
their territory. Parties to the Court's statute would select from
a list of international offenses those for which they would be
bound to provide assistance to the Court. An ICC would not be
a full-time body, but rather an established structure (a paper
court) which could be called into operation when required. In
its May 1993 Report to the United Nations, the United States
acknowledged that "the basic approach advocated in the [1992
ILC Working Group Report]... strikes a proper and realistic
balance between the many competing interests at stake."17
During the 1992 session of the UN General Assembly, the
United States found itself isolated in its position that more
study was needed before the ILC should begin drafting a stat-
ute for an ICC. I8 On November 25, 1992, the United States re-
luctantly joined consensus on a UN General Assembly
resolution that requested the ILC to undertake "the elaboration
of a draft statute for an international criminal court as a matter
of priority as from its next session."19 The United States did
manage to slow down the process, however, by insisting on the
insertion of a clause in the resolution requiring the ILC to sub-
mit a "progress report," rather than a completed statute, to the
1993 session of the General Assembly.
Notwithstanding this clause, the ILC submitted a compre-
hensive draft statute to the General Assembly for consideration
at its 1993 session. The ILC's draft statute was based in large
part on the statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal that had recently
been approved by the Security Council. By the time the ILC's
proposed statute came up for discussion in the United Nations
Sixth (Legal) Committee in October 1993, the Clinton Adminis-
tration had decided to take a more supportive approach to the
creation of an ICC and to become actively involved in the effort
to resolve the remaining obstacles. Thus, in his speech before
the Sixth Committee on October 27, State Department Legal
Adviser Conrad Harper stated:
17 See U.S. Department of State, supra note 8 at 2.
18 See STAmzNT By EDwin D. WLLAMSON, supra note 4.
19 GA. Res. 47/33 of November 25, 1992.
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My government has decided to take a fresh look at the establish-
ment of [an international criminal] court. We recognize that in
certain instances egregious violations of international law may go
unpunished because of a lack of an effective national forum for
prosecution. We also recognize that, although there are certain
advantages to the establishment of ad hoc tribunals, this process
is time consuming and may thus diminish the ability to act
promptly in investigating and prosecuting such offenses. In gen-
eral, although the underlying issues must be appropriately re-
solved, the concept of an international criminal court is an
important one, and one in which we have a significant and posi-
tive interest. This is a serious and important effort which should
be continued, and we intend to be actively and constructively
involved. 20
Though somewhat qualified, Harper's remarks constituted the
announcement of a major U.S. policy and strategy reversal on
the issue of an ICC. The importance of Harper's announcement
cannot be overstated. Without active U.S. support, there is lit-
tle chance for establishing an effective ICC.
HI. ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT STATUTE
By borrowing liberally from the Statute of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, the ILC came up with what State Department Legal
Adviser Conrad Harper characterized as a "thoughtful and seri-
ous" draft.2 ' As written, however, the draft statute contains
several serious problems, which are discussed below. 22
A. Structure of the Court
Pursuant to Article 5 of the draft statute, the ICC would
have three organs: a Trial Court, a Registry (administrative of-
fice), and a Procuracy (office of prosecutor). As written the draft
20 UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, STATEMENT BY THE HON.
oRABLE CoNRAD K HARPER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL ADvisoR To THE UNrrED NA-
TIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE SIXTH COMMITrEE, USUN Press Release #171-
(93) (1993) (hereafter STATEMENT BY CONRAD K. HARPER).
21 Id. at 1.
22 Some of the analysis that follows will be elaborated upon in greater detail
in an upcoming Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on An Interna-
tional Criminal Court, which the author helped prepare. That Report will provide
a lengthy line-by-line analysis of the IL's draft statute for an ICC. In contrast,
the following comments focus only on the most important areas in which the draft
statute should be revised.
19941
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statute does not establish a separate office of Defense Counsel,
although defendants, under Article 44, would have the right to
court-appointed counsel. It is important that the ICC have an
independent Office of Defense Counsel to ensure adequate rep-
resentation of the accused and promote institutional balance.
The Office of Defense Counsel could develop an expertise simi-
lar to that of the Procuracy, and would also enhance the adver-
sarial nature of the Court. Both the Procuracy and Office of
Defense Counsel would be able to monitor their counterpart's
interaction with the Court and further ensure that the proceed-
ings will be impartial.23 If an Office of Defense Counsel is es-
tablished as proposed, the staff of the Registry should be
divided into three separate staffs for the Procuracy, the Office of
Defense Counsel, and for the Court.
In addition, in contrast to the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tri-
bunal, the draft statute does not provide the ICC with a sepa-
rate appellate chamber. Rather, the appeals chamber
envisaged in Articles 55 and 56 of the draft statute would be
composed of seven trial judges who did not take part in the trial
of the defendant. It is a fundamental principle of U.S jurispru-
dence that judges of the same rank should not review each
other's decisions. This principle is also codified in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 24, which provides
that "everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal ac-
cording to law."25 This principle reflects the concern that judges
normally serving in a trial capacity have inherent difficulty
overruling decisions by judges with whom they normally would
serve as colleagues. Consequently, the statute should be re-
vised to provide for the creation of a separate appeals chamber
in addition to a separate office of Defense Counsel.
23 See ABA Report on the International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia (1993) at 19 for an elaboration of the justifi-
cations for an Office of Defense Counsel.
24 GA. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967).
25 Id. at Art. 14.5 (emphasis added).
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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The basic approach to the Court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion contained within Article 22 of the ILC draft statute is
sound. The Court would have jurisdiction over those crimes
covered by international conventions that are widely accepted
by States representing all of the world's major legal systems
and that have an extradite or prosecute obligation. While most
of the offenses listed are unlikely to engender much criticism26,
the inclusion of "apartheid" to the list seems inappropriate con-
sidering how far South Africa has come in dismantling the yes
tiges of that heinous practice. In addition, the list does n6t
include torture and nuclear terrorism as those crimes are de-
fined in the Torture Convention 27 and the Convention on the
Protection of Nuclear Materials. 28 This is an unfortunate omis-
sion, and should be corrected.
26 Such offenses include: genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions, aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, attacks against interna-
tionally protected persons, and maritime terrorism. See Geneva Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (signed
December 9, 1948; entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (Signed December 16, 1970;
entered into force Oct. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.IA.S. No. 7570,974 U.N.T.S.
177 (Signed September 23, 1971; entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146,34 U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146 (1979), (Signed December 17, 1979;
entered into force June 4, 1983), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.IA.S. No. 8532, 1015
U.N.T.S. 243 (Signed December 14, 1973; entered into force Feb. 20, 1977); Con-
vention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, reprinted in 27 LL.M. 668 (1988).
27 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Seas., Supp. No.
51, U.N. Doc. Af39151 (1985).
28 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, done at Vienna
on Oct. 26, 1979, entered into force on Feb. 8, 1987, T.IA.S. No. 11,080. President
Clinton used his first major foreign policy address on September 27, 1993, at the
19941
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In addition, the ILC should reconsider whether major drug
crimes, as defined in the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs2 9 should be added to the list (especially if Ar-
ticle 26 is deleted as proposed below). It is true that drug traf-
ficking is of an entirely different order from the other
international crimes listed in Article 22; however, one of the
major needs cited for an ICC has been the inability of Carib-
bean, Central American, and Latin American countries to pros-
ecute major drug traffickers.30
Article 21 of the draft statute provides for a review confer-
ence to examine the operation of the ICC's statute. The confer-
ence also considers possible additions to the list of crimes for
which the ICC has subject matter jurisdiction including, "in
particular, the addition to that list of the Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind." The Draft Code of
Crimes is like a bad penny that continues to turn up in relation
to the ICC. Many States and commentators have strongly ob-
jected to the Code of Crimes.3 1 As they have pointed out, the
Code is redundant with existing international conventions and
would be disruptive of these conventions where the Code devi-
ates from existing statements of the law. Moreover, it fails to
specify the state of mind necessary to be charged with a crimi-
nal violation and neglects to define offenses with sufficient pre-
cision to inform people of what acts will be considered
criminal. 32 Consequently, the reference to the Code of Crimes
should be deleted from Article 21.
Article 26 of the draft statute would give the ICC additional
subject matter jurisdiction over other crimes "under general in-
ternational law" and "under national law which give effect to
provisions of a multilateral treaty," provided that the State on
United Nations General Assembly, to urge international cooperation to meet the
growing threat of "nuclear terrorism". See Clinton supra note 7.
29 Signed on December 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82115, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 403.
30 See Scharf supra note 2 at 152-3.
31 See M. CHEPuF BASsIouNI, Co SENTAREEs ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw Co i-
bassioN's 1991 DRAFT CODE OF CRIMEs AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURrY OF MAN-
KnD (1993).
32 See generally, Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The
U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal statute is void (as a constitutional law
matter) when it is so vague and imprecise that "[mien of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Id. at 391.
112 [Vol. 6:103
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whose territory the suspect is present and the State where the
offense occurred gives their consent. This is perhaps the most
problematic provision of the entire statute. It would potentially
give the ICC jurisdiction over uncodified, open-ended offenses
that are not defined with sufficient specificity and precision to
inform people of what acts will be considered criminal. In addi-
tion, it would give the ICC jurisdiction over offenses listed in
regional conventions and international conventions that the
United States and other countries have chosen not to ratify be-
cause of objections to their subject matter. This Article should
be omitted altogether from the Statute.
The draft statute treats the crime of aggression as a special
case. Under Article 27, the ICC would have jurisdiction over
the offense of aggression if the Security Council has found that
the suspect's State has been guilty of aggression. The crime of
aggression is not defined in any international convention. The
only officially adopted definition of aggression is that contained
in General Assembly Resolution 3314 adopted in 1974. The his-
tory of that Resolution illustrates that it was intended only as a
political guide and not a binding definition. Article 27 should
also be omitted from the Statute.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
The issue of personal jurisdiction concerns whether a State
should consent before the Court can obtain jurisdiction over a
particular accused and the form of this consent. Under the
ILC's draft statute, the ICC can prosecute a case if any State
which had jurisdiction under the relevant treaty to try the ac-
cused consents to the ICC's jurisdiction. For most offenses, this
would include the State of the perpetrator's nationality, the
State of the victim's nationality, the State where the offense oc-
curred, and the State where the perpetrator is found. Under
this formula, the ICC could pursue prosecution even where the
State with custody of the offender refuses to consent. This for-
mulation departs radically from the sensible approach sketched
out in the ILC Working Group's 1992 report. If the purpose of
the court is to give States a third alternative to prosecution or
extradition of international criminals found within their terri-
tory, then the consent of the State with custody of the offender
should in all cases be required (with the exception of cases insti-
19941
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tuted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter33 as envisaged by Article 25 of the draft statute). This
consent can either be general or on a case-by-case basis. If that
State does not consent, it would be obligated to either prosecute
or extradite the offender under the relevant treaty.
However, as the American Bar Association Task Force rec-
ognized, "few, if any, states would be willing to agree to the ju-
risdiction of an international criminal court with the authority
to try their nationals without their consent."3 4 The United
States, for example, would have a strong desire to prevent its
former officials from being hauled before an ICC for interna-
tionally controversial actions such as the 1986 bombing of
Libya, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, the downing of
the Iranian Airbus, and the recent cruise missile attack on
Baghdad.
While perhaps diminishing the effectiveness of an ICC, re-
quiring the consent of the State of nationality (at least in cases
involving officials and former officials) is probably the price to
be paid for widespread international acceptance. Moreover, the
negative effect of this consent requirement would be minimized
if such consent were not required in cases instituted by the Se-
curity Council under Article 25 of the draft statute. Thus, for
example, the Security Council could insist that Libya surrender
to the ICC the two officials allegedly responsible for the bomb-
ing of Pan Am Flight 103 notwithstanding the consent provi-
sion. The ILC's proposed statute should be revised to
incorporate this approach.
D. Applicable Law
If the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction is limited as recom-
mended above, it would only have to turn to the relevant inter-
national conventions for the elements of the offenses over which
it has jurisdiction. Article 28(c) of the draft statute directs the
court to apply "as a subsidiary source, any applicable rule of
national law." This is an important provision since the relevant
conventions do not specify such issues as defenses, burden of
33 Signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, entered into force on Oct. 24,
1945; reprinted in 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043.
34 See American Bar Association Task Force on An International Criminal
Court, supra note 2 at 109.
[Vol. 6:103
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/12
SYMPOSIUM ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
proof, and mitigating circumstances. The statute, under Article
53, also envisages the court referring to national law to deter-
mine the length of a term of imprisonment or the amount of a
fine to be imposed for a crime, and to specify laws as to pardon,
parole or commutation of sentence under Article 67. The draft
statute does not, however, specify which State's laws are to be
applied for these purposes. This creates uncertainty and leaves
the court with too much discretion. The solution would be for
the statute to specify that the ICC would apply the supplemen-
tal law of the State in which the offender was found ( including
its choice of law rules)- a sort of international version of the
Erie doctrine found in United States jurisprudence.3 5
E. Rules of Evidence and Procedure
Article 19 of the draft statute provides that the Judges of
the ICC will promulgate the Court's rules of evidence and proce-
dure. For many States, these rules are likely to be critical to
the acceptability of an ICC. Under Article 19, the ICC's judges
have broad discretion to adopt rules that, for example, do not
fully protect the rights of the accused. In this vein, the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo Tribunals have been subject to criticism for
their use of ex parte affidavits against the accused at trial.
Instead, the Parties to the court's statute should assume
the responsibility for developing rules of evidence and proce-
dure and incorporate them into a protocol that would be
adopted at the same time as the court's statute. They would by
no means have to begin the process from scratch. The rules de-
veloped for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal could serve as
the basis, with appropriate modifications, for the rules for a per-
manent ICC.
F. Surrender of the Accused
The draft statute is silent on the issue of whether surren-
der of the accused to the ICC should be deemed "extradition."
In its 1992 Report, the ILC Working Group suggested the novel
proposal that surrender of persons to the ICC would not need to
be considered extradition. As characterized in that Report, this
35 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Holding that a fed-
eral court in a diversity suit should apply the law of the state in which it sits).
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would enable the numerous States that have legislation or con-
stitutional prohibitions against the extradition of their nation-
als nevertheless to surrender such persons to the ICC, on the
theory that the ICC is, in effect, simply an extension of their
own national courts. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest
that the courts of such States would accept this theory. More-
over, in "The Jury is Still Out," I explained why such an ar-
rangement would run afoul of Article M, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution36 , which requires that any court ex-
ercising the judicial power of the United States must apply
United States law, be established by Congress, and be com-
posed of judges who are assured of life tenure during good be-
havior and who are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.3 7 Consequently, the statute should
make clear that surrender of the accused to the ICC is an
extTadition. 38
The commentary to Article 63 of the draft statute indicates
that the ILC would return during its 1994 session to the ques-
tion whether a State party that decided not to surrender an ac-
cused to the ICC should also be allowed as an alternative to
domestic prosecution to extradite the accused to another State
for prosecution. If the object of an ICC is to ensure that the
accused is prosecuted and to give States a third alternative to
extradition and domestic prosecution, there is no good reason
why a Party should not be able to choose instead to extradite
the accused to a third State. When national prosecution is
available, it has inherent advantages over prosecution before an
international body. Moreover, preserving the extradition option
is necessary if the ICC is to complement, rather than compete
with, prosecution before national tribunals.
36 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, sec. 1.
37 See Scharf; supra note 2 at 163-4.
38 Extradition is the surrender by the requested jurisdiction to the requesting
jurisdiction of an individual accused or convicted of an offense within the authority
of the latter. It requires the requesting jurisdiction to be competent to try and
punish the fugitive and to seek his surrender for that purpose. See Michael P.
Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the In-
quiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J.
ImL L. 257 (1989).
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G. Legal Assistance
The draft statute, under Article 23, allows States to desig-
nate from a list those offenses for which they accept the Court's
jurisdiction. The draft statute nevertheless requires States
that are Parties to the Court's statute but that have not ac-
cepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the type of of-
fense involved in a particular case, to render various kinds of
assistance to the Court. For example, under Article 33(2) of the
draft statute, such States are required to ensure that the ac-
cused is arrested and detained. Article 46 provides that the
Court has authority to "require any person to give evidence at
trial," even if that person resides in and is a national of a State
that has not accepted the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to the
particular offense. The commentary to Article 58 provides that
Parties have a "general obligation to cooperate with and provide
judicial assistance" to the Court, even in cases over which they
have not recognized the ICC's jurisdiction. Article 45 requires
Parties not to try the accused if he/she has been acquitted or
given a light sentence by the ICC even for offenses over which
the State has not accepted the Court's jurisdiction.
It makes little sense for State parties that have not ac-
cepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the particu-
lar crime under investigation or prosecution to be under any
legal obligation to cooperate with the Court. Nor should those
States be constrained with regard to their authority to institute
their own prosecution or to extradite the offender to a third
State rather than the ICC. Rather, such States should come
within the terms of Article 59 of the draft statute, which calls
for the voluntary cooperation of States not Parties to the statute
"on the basis of comity, a unilateral declaration, an ad hoc ar-
rangement or other agreement with the court." The only excep-
tion to this should be for cases initiated by the Security Council,
as to which all States should be obligated to render assistance
to the ICC.
H. Appeals
Article 55 of the draft statute provides that the Prosecutor
may appeal the Court's judgment of acquittal by asserting com-
mission of errors of fact that have "occasioned a miscarriage of
justice." Similarly, Article 57 would allow the Prosecutor to ap-
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ply for a review of judgment upon the discovery of a new fact,
not known at the time of trial, "which could have been a decisive
factor in reaching the decision." In either case, an appeal by the
Prosecutor, resulting in a reversal of the judgment of the Trial
Court, would necessitate a new trial for the same offense, thus
violating the prohibition against double jeopardy as it is under-
stood and applied in the United States. Thus, the language of
these articles should be amended to permit only the person con-
victed by the Trial Court to request an appeal after final judg-
ment or a review proceeding. However, either the defendant or
the Prosecutor should be permitted to seek interlocutory ap-
peals of issues of law.
EI. CONCLUSION
The key to setting up a permanent ICC that is both accept-
able and effective is to give the court two different types of juris-
diction. The first type would be consensual; surrendering
offenders and providing assistance to the court would be com-
pletely voluntary on the part of the Parties to the court's Stat-
ute. Consent could be given either on a case-by-case basis or in
advance by accepting the court's jurisdiction over certain speci-
fied international offenses. The second type of jurisdiction
would be triggered by the Security Council acting under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter. In such cases, coopera-
tion with the ICC would be mandatory, backed up by the
implicit threat of Security Council imposed sanctions for
noncompliance.
I concluded my earlier article on this issue by stressing that
the United States should "participate in the study and possible
development of [an international criminal court] so that it can
influence the structure, procedures, and substance of whatever
results."39 Having pushed for four years from within the State
Department for a more forward-leaning policy toward the estab-
lishment of an ICC, it is particularly gratifying that the United
States Government has finally decided to become "actively and
constructively involved" in the endeavor.40 Now that the
United States Executive Branch is getting serious about the es-
39 See Scharf, supra note 2 at 168.
40 See STATEMeNT BY CoNRiA K. HARP, supra note 20 at 2.
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tablishment of an ICC, the analysis and proposed revisions sug-
gested above should prove useful both to the United States and
the members of the International Law Commission as they re-
turn to the ICC project in the months ahead.
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